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Abstract 
Does Governance Matter? Yes, No or Maybe 
Some Evidence from Developing Asia 
 
 
 
 
This paper seeks to explore the relationship between economic growth and 
governance performance in Asian developing economies. This exploration yields 
some interesting conclusions. First, notwithstanding its tremendous economic 
achievements, the state of governance in Asia is not stellar by international 
comparison. Indeed, a majority of these countries seem to suffer from a governance 
deficit. Second, contrary to our expectation, data do not suggest any strong positive 
link between governance and growth:  paradoxically, countries that exhibit surpluses 
in governance on average grew much slower than those with deficits. The paper ends 
with some conjecture about this apparent paradox.  
Key words. Governance, Institutions, Growth and Asia  
JEL Classification: O10, O40, O53 
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Does Governance Matter? Yes, No or Maybe 
Some Evidence from Developing Asia 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
There is a general consensus in the development community that governance has a 
critical bearing on economic and social outcomes. To begin with, good governance is 
considered the life blood of economic growth. It has been suggested that good 
governance, by promoting more efficient divisions of labor, more productive 
investment and faster implementation of social and economic polices, will lead to 
higher economic growth (United Nations 2005). Economic growth aside, good 
governance is thought to be indispensable to all manner of favorable development 
outcomes⎯from alleviating poverty to eliminating illiteracy to reducing infant and 
maternal mortality. However, a good deal of the policy discussion on governance is 
essentially axiomatic—it presumes a relationship between good governance and 
desirable economic and social outcomes—and not causal, grounded in systematic 
empirical analyses. Nevertheless, despite the absence of robust empiricism, 
governance has figured prominently in the international development agenda. 
Besides being incorporated in the Millennium Development Goals (Goal 8 affirms ‘a 
commitment to good governance—both nationally and internationally’), governance 
is a large determining factor in the allocation of aid under the Millennium Challenge 
Account of the US government and the IDA1 resources of the World Bank.2  
 
                                                 
1 The  International Development Association ( IDA) is a World Bank affiliate. It provides 
assistance to the world’s 81 poorest countries where the vast majority of poor people 
reside. This assistance is in the form of interest-free loans and grants for programs for 
promoting economic growth and improving living conditions 
2 Other multilateral development banks, including the Asian Development Bank (ADB), 
follow an aid allocation formula similar to that of  IDA.  
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This paper begins with a brief discussion of the meaning of governance and the 
quantitative indicators used to measure it. It then goes on to make an assessment of 
the relative performance of Asian economies vis-à-vis the global average. This 
assessment allows us to partition the Asian economies into ‘governance- deficit’ and 
‘governance-surplus’ countries.3 However, further analysis of the economic growth 
performance of these two sets of countries yields an apparently paradoxical result: 
countries that exhibit deficits in their governance performance have on average 
consistently outperformed those that are governance surplus. This finding, however, 
does not provide a resounding attestation to the critical role of governance to 
economic development. The concluding section offers some conjecture for this 
curious finding and its implications for policy.   
 
II.  WHAT DOES GOVERNANCE MEAN? 
 
Governance, according to the American Heritage Dictionary, is ‘the act, process or 
power of governing: government.’  Good governance is what a good government 
does; ergo, bad governance is what a bad government does. Therefore the first step 
in defining governance is to agree on what constitutes a good government. Different 
definitions have highlighted different aspects of governance. First, some have 
underscored the political regimes, relating to political contestability and processes, 
political and civil liberties, and legitimacy of the government. From this perspective, 
democracy, human rights, participation and freedom of the press: these are some of 
the critical elements of governance. Second, some have emphasized economic 
management. This definition focuses on the soundness with which the government 
exercises its authority in the management of a country’s social and economic 
resources.  According to this perspective, sound economic management, which 
                                                 
3 The terms ‘governance- deficit’ and ‘governance-surplus’ countries are due to Kaufmann 
(2004).   
 4
requires the support of an efficient bureaucracy, should be grounded in a 
transparent, participatory and accountable decision-making process. Good 
governance thus conceived would result in the improvement in the provision of 
public services and in efficacious economic management that helps avoid delays of 
execution, malfeasance and corruption, and other costs of distortions.  
 
Third, some have emphasized the quality and content of economic policy to address the 
country’s development problems.  From this perspective, the quality of governance 
is reflected in the capacity of the government to design, formulate and implement 
appropriate policies. However, designing an appropriate set of policies is much easier 
said than done. Appropriate policies depend not only on the specific objective of 
development—whether it is economic growth or poverty reduction or lower 
inequality—but also on the social, political , cultural and historical contexts . In other 
words, there is no magic solution applicable to all countries at different stages of 
development—or in other words, there is no ‘one size fits all’ policy.  
 
The classical view amongst economists, famously articulated by Smith (1776), has 
been that a good government protects property rights and keeps regulations and 
taxes light.  In other words, the good government is relatively non-interventionist. 
However, this ‘minimalist view’ of government no longer holds wide sway and has 
been replaced by less orthodox views that assign  more expansive roles for the 
government. In particular, in recent years, the Washington-based international 
financial institutions have advocated a set of neo-liberal policies, widely known as the 
Washington consensus (Williamson 1990). However, these policies have become the 
subject of wide-ranging debates in the development community before they could 
approach anything close to a consensus4.  
                                                 
4 The Washington consensus has proven sterile in rekindling growth. Despite the widespread 
application of these policies through structural adjustment programs in the 1980s and 
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 Finally, some have taken a more expansive view and focused on formal and informal 
institutions—particularly, the legal and judicial framework— which define, regulate and 
mediate the interactions between the government and citizens, including the private 
sector and civil society. This definition highlights the separation, independence and 
effectiveness of the judiciary, the enforcement of contracts and the rule of law. The 
latter means the supremacy of law, which applies equally without discrimination to all 
individuals as well as the government.  
 
In short, as should be obvious from the above brief discussion, governance remains 
a broad, multi-dimensional concept that lacks operational precision. It has often 
been used as an umbrella concept to federate a whole assortment of different, albeit 
related, ideas.  
 
International financial institutions (IFIs), which are precluded by their charters from 
making forays into the political arena, have adopted a narrower, economic- 
                                                                                                                                     
1990s, growth rates in the developing world declined, compared to the 1960s and 1970s 
when these countries emphasized state intervention and import substitution. As the failure 
of the Washington consensus policies became gradually apparent, new additional policies 
were appended to them. This augmented agenda of policies has come to be known as the 
Washington consensus plus. The new agenda, which has grown out of often hastily 
cobbled together programs, is very ad hoc.  The ad hoc nature of the Washington 
consensus plus agenda has been underscored by the former chief economist of the World 
Bank, Joseph Stiglitz. According to Stiglitz (2004), ‘what was added (to the agenda) 
depended on the criticism that was being leveled, on the nature of the failure that was 
being recognized. When growth failed to materialize, ‘second generation reforms’, 
including competition polices to accompany privatizations of natural monopolies, were 
added. When problems of equity were noted, the plus included female education or 
improved safety nets. When all of these versions of the Washington consensus plus too 
failed to do the trick, a new layer of reforms was added: one had to go beyond projects 
and policies to institutions, including public institutions, and their governance.’  The 
infecundity   of the Washington consensus in promoting economic development in poorer 
countries has led Stiglitz to conclude that there is no consensus about effective 
development strategies except that the Washington consensus did not provide the answer.  
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technocratic approach to governance. This approach is concerned more with 
economic policies and effectiveness of state for sound economic management than 
with such issues as the equity of the system or the legitimacy of the power structure. 
Consequently, the multilateral institutions have generally eschewed such political 
issues as democratization and human rights. Accordingly, the World Bank defines 
governance as ‘ the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a 
country’s economic and social resources for development’ (World Bank, 1992, p.1). 
In more concrete terms, the World Bank’s involvement in governance has primarily 
focused on sound development management—emphasizing public sector reform, 
public expenditure control, fiduciary management, modernization of public 
administration and privatization.  
 
Similarly, the involvement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in good 
governance has been limited to macroeconomic management. From the perspective 
of  IMF, ‘[Good governance] is  primarily concerned with macroeconomic stability, 
external viability, and orderly economic growth in member countries’ IMF (1997). 
More particularly, it focuses on two principal areas of governance: improving the 
management of public resources through reforms covering public sector institutions; 
and supporting the development and maintenance of a transparent and stable 
economic and regulatory environment conducive to efficient private sector activities.  
 
Finally, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), which is the first multilateral 
development bank to adopt a formal governance policy in 1995, defines a la the 
World Bank governance as ‘sound development management’. However, the ADB 
definition is focused essentially on the ‘ingredients of effective management [of 
public resources]’. While ADB recognizes the importance of good policies, it 
acknowledges, in light of ‘the experiences so far, especially within the region’, the 
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existence of plurality of views on good policies as well as political systems (ADB, 
1995). 
 
In sum, the IFI-approach to governance, which is embedded in the prevailing 
economic orthodoxy of economics, seeks to make a functional separation between 
development management and politics. It assumes that public policy involves 
technical and economic questions that can be solved, independently of the politics of 
the country. However, such a separation is often not feasible in practice—indeed, 
part of the failure of the economic reform programs of the IFIs in the 1990s, critics 
argue, is due to the insufficient consideration given to the issues of political economy 
of policy reform.  
 
III.  MEASURING THE QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE 
 
If defining governance has been a challenge, measuring it  is even more. Despite this 
challenge, there has in recent years emerged an active enterprise devoted to the task 
of measuring the quality of governance. Production of indicators of governance and 
institutions is now the preoccupation of many organizations and individuals. These 
indices are however, quite heterogeneous. Some reflect process while others seek to 
capture performance. They also tend to differ in terms quality and coverage—
geographical as well as temporal. Some of these data sources include: the World 
Bank; International Country Risk Guide; Freedom House; Business Environmental 
Risk Intelligence; World Economic Forum; Heritage Foundation; Transparency 
International. Finally, the Kaufman, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobotan (KKZ) index on 
governance, which seems to have emerged as the industry standard, is derived from 
an amalgam of governance data from a wide diversity of sources.  
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The KKZ dataset—which are available from Kaufman et al. (2002) and have been 
further updated in Kaufman et al. (2003)—present information on six aggregate 
indicators. These six indicators are voice and accountability, government 
effectiveness, political stability and absence of violence, regulatory quality, rule of 
law, and control of corruption. Voice and accountability includes indicators 
measuring various aspects of political process, civil liberties, and political rights. 
Government effectiveness incorporates measures on the quality of public service 
provision, the quality of bureaucracy, the insulation of the civil service from political 
pressures, and the credibility of the government commitment to policies. Regulatory 
quality measures the incidence of market-friendly policies as well as the burdens 
from excessive regulations. Rule of law includes indicators that measure the 
confidence of the agents in—and their compliance with—the rules of society. The 
final set of indicators measures the perception of corruption in the government.  
 
These six aggregate indicators which are part of the KKZ index are culled from 25 
different sources, constructed by 18 different organization including the World Bank, 
International Country Risk Guide, Business Environmental Risk Intelligence, 
Freedom House, and others (see Table 1). These indicators are essentially based on 
perceptions of governance—derived from the polls of experts and surveys of 
businessmen or the citizens in general. The governance estimate for each indicator is 
derived from individual sources in each period and is normalized so that it has a 
mean of zero and standard deviation of one. This implies that virtually all the scores 
lie between -2.5 and 2.5, and the aggregate indicators are really measures of relative 
performance of a country in a particular period. The higher the score of a country, 
the better is its performance in terms of governance.  
 
 9
Table 1. Sources of Governance Data for the KKZ Governance Indicators 
   
Source Publication 
Afrobarometer  Afrobarometer Survey  
Business Environment Risk Intelligence  Business Risk Service  
Business Environment Risk Intelligence  Qualitative Risk Measure in 
Foreign Lending  
Columbia University  State Capacity Project  
Economist Intelligence Unit  Country Risk Service  
European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development  
Transition Report  
Freedom House  Nations in Transition  
Freedom House  Freedom in the World  
Gallup International  Gallup Millennium Survey  
Gallup International  50th Anniversary Survey  
Gallup International  Voice of the People Survey  
Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal  Economic Freedom Index  
Institute for Management and 
Development  
World Competitiveness Yearbook  
Latinobarometro  Latinobarometro Surveys  
Political Risk Services  International Country Risk Guide  
Price Waterhouse Coopers  Opacity Index  
Reporters Without Borders  Reporters Without Borders  
Global Insight's DRI McGraw-Hill  Country Risk Review  
State Department / Amnesty International Human Rights Report  
World Bank  Business Enterprise Environment 
Survey  
World Bank  World Business Environment 
Survey  
World Bank  Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessments  
World Economic Forum  Global Competitiveness Report  
World Economic Forum  Africa Competitiveness Report  
World Markets Research Center  World Markets Online  
  
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003) 
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IV.  DMCS IN THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE LEAGUE 
 
In this section, we use the popular and elaborate KKZ index to infer the quality of 
governance in Asian developing countries. In particular, we confine ourselves to 
ADB’s developing member countries (DMCs): how they fare in relation to the 
international standard.  However, it should be noted that as countries differ in their 
income levels, they would also differ in terms of quality of governance. It is expected 
that the countries that are economically better off would attain higher levels of 
governance. It would, therefore, be unfair to compare the quality of governance in 
Switzerland with that in Nepal 5.  To compare an apple with an apple, we first derive 
an average international line that indicates the expected international governance level 
for that particular income level. This line is derived by regressing the KKZ 
governance levels of countries against per capita income levels. For this regression, 
we use the KKZ composite governance index (which is the weighted sum of all six 
individual indicators, with each indicator being assigned an equal weight). The per 
capita income used for this regression is the ‘real’ income of countries in 2003, which 
is measured in terms of 2000 purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars. The regression 
uses data for 151 countries from all over the world for which the KKZ governance 
indices are available for 2002. As expected, the regression line is upward-sloping, 
indicating that higher the income level the better the quality of governance.  
 
Figure 1 graphs the regression line that represents the reference international line—
that is, the expected level of quality of governance for various real income levels. The 
countries that lie above this line are those whose quality of governance is above the 
                                                 
5 Poor countries are often too poor  to afford good governance. Among other things, good 
governance requires a well-functioning and adequately paid civil service and judiciary, 
proper information technology for registering property and ensuring transparency in 
procurement, and sufficient equipment and training for an efficient police force. All this 
requires substantial financial outlays (UN 2005). 
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level expected of their income levels. The countries that lie below the line are those 
whose quality of governance falls short of the level expected of their income levels.   
 
It may be noted in passing that such regressions between governance indicators and 
real income, as attempted here, are not new. Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) have used 
similar regressions between individual governance indicators and real income to 
assess the state of governance in its different dimensions in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. A similar empirical exercise has been carried out by Radelet (2004) who 
finds no evidence that Africa’s governance, on average, is worse than anywhere else 
after controlling for income levels. 
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Figure 1. Governance and Real Per Capita Income 
 
 
Note: The figure plots the governance indicator against real GDP per capita in 2003. The 
governance rating in the vertical axis is the (equally) weighted average of six indicators of 
governance compiled by Kaufman et al. (2003). The estimated regression is given by 
governance = -5.64 + 0.67 ln (GDP per capita). The coefficients of the regression are 
significant at the 1 percent level and R2 is 0.71. 
 
 
 
How do the DMCs fare in this comparison of ‘governance gap’? Our calculation 
suggests that of the 29 DMCs, for which the KKZ governance indices exist, ten 
countries fare better than the international average for their income levels. The 
remaining 19 countries fare worse than the international average—that is, they suffer 
from governance deficits of varying magnitudes.  
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Table 2 
Country Classification by Governance Performance  
Above-average 
Performers 
Below-average 
Performers 
 
• Hong Kong  
• India 
• Malaysia 
• Mongolia 
• Nepal 
• Singapore 
• Solomon Island 
• Vanuatu 
• Samoa 
• Sri Lanka 
 
 
 
• Azerbaijan 
• Bangladesh 
• China 
• Fiji 
• Indonesia 
• Kazakhstan 
• Republic of Korea 
• Kyrgyz Republic 
• Lao PDR 
• Pakistan 
• Papua New Guinea 
• Philippines 
• Tajikistan 
• Thailand 
• Tonga 
• Turkmenistan 
• Uzbekistan 
• Cambodia 
• Vietnam 
 
               Source: Author’s estimates  
 
Table 2 reports the governance performance of 29 DMCs. As Table 2 indicates, the 
performance of the DMCs, which are often dubbed as the most dynamic group of 
countries in the world, does not look particularly impressive, relative to their income 
levels. About two thirds of the countries perform worse than the corresponding 
averages and suffer from governance deficits of varying degrees. 
 
In a recent paper, Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) have noted that the strong empirical 
relationship between per capita income and the quality of governance is essentially 
due to the strong causal relationship running from governance to per capita income. 
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Their empirical work suggests that the causal relationship running from income to 
governance is either weak or negative. If we take this result seriously, then there is no 
virtuous circle running between income and governance6. Thus, given this one-way 
causation from governance to income, it is to be expected that the countries that 
experience a governance surplus can in general hope to achieve a more rapid 
economic growth compared to those that incur a deficit.   
 
How is this expectation borne out in reality in the context of Asian developing 
economies? To check, we compare the economic growth performance of the 
governance-surplus countries in the last 5 years (1999−2003 for which complete data 
sets are available) with the growth performance of the governance-deficit countries.  
Figure 2 plots the average annual growth rates of these two sets of countries. It 
should be noted here that to exclude the possibility of the results being driven by 
large countries, we have used simple—rather than weighted average—for growth 
rates. AA is the growth curve for the governance-surplus countries and BB is the 
growth curve for the governance-deficit countries. Surprisingly, the countries with 
presumably better governance fare worse in economic growth than those with worse 
governance. Indeed, the average growth rate of the governance-surplus countries is 
less than half that of the governance-deficit countries. Moreover the governance-
deficit countries have a lower variance in their growth rates (at 0.1) than that of the 
governance-surplus countries (at 2.6).  
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Kaufmann and Kraay attribute this lack of virtuous circle to ‘state capture’—what they 
describe as the undue and illicit influence of the elite in the shaping of laws, policies and 
regulations of the state. According to this explanation, this state capture by vested interests 
allows the elites to benefit from the status quo of misgovernance and hence they continue 
to resist demands for change even if incomes rise.  
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Figure 2. GDP Growth Rates in Asian Economies 
 
 
  Source: Author’s calculations. Data are derived from  World Bank (2004) 
 
 
How does one explain this seemingly paradoxical result? One conjecture is that this 
is largely due to what economists call convergence—that is, poor countries tend to grow 
faster than the richer countries. However, on the face of it, it does not seem 
particularly plausible, as both groups include an assortment of countries at different 
stages of development with different income levels.  
 
However, to investigate the question more rigorously, we next estimate a 
parsimonious growth equation, which is specified as follows: gdp growth = a + b (ln gdp 
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per capita) + c (governance) + errors, where a, b, and c are the parameters to be estimated7. 
Our regression involves 29 Asian DMCs for which relevant data are available8. The 
estimated equation is given by: GDP growth= 4.26 – 0.06 ln GDP per capita (in 1999) – 
1.91 Governance.  
 
The coefficients of the regression are found insignificant, except for governance 
which is significant at 5 percent level of significance and R2  of the regression is .15. 
Note that the regression does not provide any evidence of convergence.  Figure 3 is 
the partial scatter plot between growth and initial income.  The partial scatter shows 
the unexplained portion of GDP growth against the unexplained portion of initial 
income (that is, unexplained by the other right-hand side variables in the regression).  
Thus, the figure depicts the partial correlation between GDP growth and initial 
income, after controlling for other variables in the regression. Clearly, Figure 1 does 
not show any correlation, either positive or negative, between GDP growth and 
initial income and hence, provide any support for the convergence hypothesis.  
Similarly, Figure 4 is the partial scatter plot between growth and governance. Again, 
it does not suggest any positive relationship between growth and governance. 
Indeed, if there is a suggestion there in the scatter plot , it is in the opposite 
direction!   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 In light of the findings of Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) that governance is largely 
independent of income, we have treated governance as an exogenous variable in the 
regression equation.  
8 The explanatory variable, GDP growth, is the average annual GDP growth for five years,  
1999-2003. The initial income refers to GDP per capita in 1999 (expressed in 1995 
international dollars). All these data are derived from World Bank (2004). We use the 
KKZ composite index to represent the governance variable. 
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Figure 3: Partial Plot of GDP growth and Initial Income 
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Figure 4: Partial Plot of GDP growth and Governance  
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V.  RESULTS: WHAT DO THEY LEAD US TO? 
 
The foregoing analysis suggests two conclusions. First, despite the enormous 
economic dynamism of the DMCs, everything is not well in these countries as far as 
governance is concerned. These countries are by no stretch of imagination the 
paragons of governance at the global stage (when such comparisons control for 
income differences). Second, the comparison of growth performance of governance-
surplus and governance-deficit countries throws up a big puzzle: that the countries 
exhibiting  a deficit in governance tend to outperform those exhibiting  a surplus—
and by a large margin. This certainly does not provide a ringing endorsement to the 
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general notion that governance makes a critical difference in the growth outcomes of 
countries.  
 
How does one explain this apparent paradox? It may be instructive to look beyond 
the average to the performance of individual countries. A conspicuous example is 
China. Though the country has in recent years undertaken an extensive reform 
program , it is , as noted by Qian (2003),   in many ways heterodox and deviates 
significantly from the current conventional wisdom.  This reform program has been 
characterized by   partial and often two-track liberalization, limited deregulation,   
financial repression, an unorthodox legal regime and the absence of private property-
rights.    Though the country does not fare well by the conventional metric of 
governance, it is a superstar when it comes to economic growth. It has created, 
within the short time span of a generation, a kind of growth and development 
miracle hitherto unknown in human history.  
 
A comparative study of Vietnam and the Philippines by Pritchett (2003) notes a 
similar paradox. While Vietnam has undertaken a program of Chinese style of 
reforms leading to divergent and heterodox institutions, the Philippines has followed 
a path that is more traditional and adheres to today’s current wisdom. Though the 
Philippines fares better than Vietnam in terms of the conventional measure of 
governance, the former has virtually economically stagnated and    the latter is fast 
‘booming out of a poverty trap’.  
 
Does this suggest that governance is unimportant for economic and social 
development? Perhaps that may not be exactly the right lesson to take from this 
exercise. The more correct inference would be that the conventional measures of 
governance such as the KKZ are too coarse to capture the nuances of governance-
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growth interactions. This has been further corroborated in the recent reviews of the 
aid effectiveness literature (see, for example, Quibria 2005). 
 
The main reason that these indices fail to capture the nuances of interactions 
between governance and growth is that they are based on an implicit model of 
governance which exists in institutions available in western advanced economies. 
The larger the gradient of the state of governance of a country from the benchmark, 
the lower it scores in the traditional metric of governance. However, economic 
growth⎯or for that matter, the broader indicator  of economic and social 
development—does not move monotonically with the diminishing gradient of 
governance from the benchmark. This point has been forcefully and cogently argued 
by Qian (2003, p.304): 
 
   The problem is a naïve perspective on institutions. The naïve perspective 
often confuses the goal (i.e., where to finish) with the process (i.e., how to 
get there) and thus tends to ignore the intriguing issues of transition paths 
connecting the starting point and the goal. It is like neglecting the “transition 
equations (or “equations of motion”) and the “initial conditions” in dynamic 
programming. Although building best-practice institutions is a desirable goal, 
getting institutions right is a process involving incessant changes interacting 
with initial conditions. 
 
Although building best-practice institutions is a desirable goal, the experience of 
China in this respect is highly illustrative. It has not jettisoned the whole existing 
traditional framework of governance, but has made gradual and modest 
experimentation—whether it relates to property rights or to internal and external 
economic liberalization. Indeed, as Rodrik (2003) argues, modest changes in 
institutions and the structure of governance can produce large growth payoffs, but 
the required changes need to be highly context-specific. Similarly, Dixit (2004, p.4) 
notes, ‘it is not always necessary to create replicas of Western-style [governance] 
from scratch, it may be possible to work with such alternative institutions as are 
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available, and build on them’. This provides some general lessons for policymakers in 
developing economies as well as officials in international development agencies.  
  
In particular, one lesson worth emphasizing is that improving governance is a 
gradual and deliberate exercise in incrementalism that needs to build on the existing 
structure. There is a path dependency in institutional reform that precludes either 
wholesale transplanting an alien framework or selective cherry-picking. By necessity, 
such an exercise in reform needs to be anchored in deeper analysis, informed by a 
country’s history, polity, and society, something that is not often available in 
abundance in a harried aid bureaucracy.   
 
VI.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
To sum up, notwithstanding the tremendous economic achievements of developing 
Asia, the state of governance in these countries—if measured by the KKZ 
composite index, a popular index of governance—is in no way stellar by 
international comparisons. Indeed, a large majority of developing countries in Asia, 
according to this indicator, seem to suffer from various degrees of governance 
deficits, compared to the international averages, relative to their incomes. What is 
apparently highly paradoxical is that countries that exhibit deficits in their 
governance indicators on average register a much higher growth on a sustained basis 
compared to those that exhibit a deficit.  
 
This of course suggests two possibilities. The first possibility is that the link between 
governance and economic performance is not as strong or immediate as is widely 
presumed. It has been suggested that governance has only a second-order effect on 
economic performance.  The first-order effect on economic growth comes from 
human as well as social capital that shapes the productive capacities of a society 
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(Glaesar et al. 2004).  Improvements in one may not go hand in hand with the other, 
thereby creating a disconnect between the two.  According to this line of reasoning , 
mere improvements in governance—unless accompanied by commensurate 
improvements in human and social capital—will not result in superior growth 
outcomes.  
 
The second possibility is that while governance and economic performance are 
strongly correlated, the conventional measures—such as the KKZ composite 
index—fail to capture the nuances of governance-growth interactions.  In this 
connection,  two points are worth emphasizing.  
 
First, as noted among others by Rodrik and Mukand (2005), sound economic 
principles—such as incentives, competition, fiscal prudence, sound money, and 
property rights—do not translate into unique institutional and governance solutions, 
but need to be adapted to particular economic and social contexts.   This may imply 
different configurations of institutions of governance in different times and 
locations. These   institutions can be quite heterodox, particularly in the context of 
the poorer and transitional economies, and deviate significantly from Western-style 
governance. Measuring and quantifying these   heterodox institutions of governance 
from a common, conventional yardstick can be both difficult and challenging.   As 
many transitional economies in Asia—particularly, China and Vietnam—have 
embarked upon unconventional institutional innovations, these innovations fare 
poorly when viewed from the lenses of  conventional wisdom. However, many of 
these innovations have proven to be appropriate for these countries and resulted in 
high growth and rapid economic and social transformation.   
 
Second, all dimensions of governance are not equally critical for growth or economic 
development at all stages of development.  It is not the aggregate score on 
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governance but the performance on the critical components that matters. As noted, 
among others by Quibria (2002) the miracle economies of East Asia at their earlier 
stage of economic transformation emphasized more on the economic dimensions of 
governance, relating to government effectiveness and regulatory quality, rather than 
those political dimensions relating to voice and accountability or control of 
corruption. Thus, though many of the miracle economies did not fare well in terms 
of conventional measures of governance, they posted robust growth. A similar 
picture seems to be implicit in recent data as well.  Many of the high-growth 
economies have carefully ensured property rights—or variants of them—but not 
necessarily been meticulous about political liberalization.   This would suggest that it 
is not the aggregate score on governance but the scores on some particular 
components on governance—those that are critical in relation to the stage of 
development— that are important for economic growth.   
 
In the absence of further empirical scrutiny, the above explanation, though plausible,   
remains conjectural. There may be other equally plausible explanations of the 
apparent growth-governance paradox. If the above story contains a kernel of truth, it 
has two obvious implications. First, there is country- specificity with regard to 
appropriate governance and institutions and this specificity stems from differences in 
history, geography or initial conditions. To match this specificity of local conditions, 
there is a need for experimentation to ensure that the system of governance and local 
conditions dovetail.   Second, while aggregate measures of governance—such as the 
KKZ and other indices —may be helpful for some purposes, they can be somewhat 
misleading for others (as they are often bereft of important qualitative nuances). 
Therefore, one should handle these indices with care—and refrain from their 
indiscriminate and mechanical application, particularly when it comes to important 
policy matters.  
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